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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME II. JUNE, 1927 NUMBER 4
CHANGES IN WASHINGTON LAND TITLE
RECORD LAW
Among the many laws enacted by the recent Legislature, which were
approved by the Governor, and took effect at 12 o'clock midnight June
8, is one which governs the filing of land title instruments for recorda-
tion and repealing the existing statute, Section 10596 of Remington's
Compiled Statutes. The title and the sections of this act material to
this discussion are set forth below.
2Sess. L. 1927, Oh. 278, p. 670. "An Act relating to the recording of
mnstruments concerning real property and repealing section 10596 of Rem-
ington's Compiled Statutes of Washington.
"Section 1. (1) The term 'real property' as used in this act includes
lands, tenements and hereditaments and chattels real and mortgage liens
thereon except a leasehold for a term not exceeding two years.
(2) The term 'purchaser' includes every person to whom any estate or
interest in real property is conveyed for a valuable consideration and
every assignee of a mortgage, lease or other conditional estate.
(3) The term 'conveyance' includes every written instrument by which
any estate or interest in real property is created, transferred, mortgaged
or assigned or by which the title to any real property may be effected,
including a instrument in execution of a power, although the power be
one of revocation only, and an instrument releasing in whole or in part,
postponing or subordinating a mortgage or other lien, except a will, a
lease for a term of not exceeding two years, an executory contract for the
sale or purchase of lands, and an instrument granting a power to convey
real property as the agent or attorney or the owner of the property. 'To
convey' is to execute a 'conveyance' as defined in this subdivision.
(4) The term 'recording officer' means the county auditor of the
county.
"Section 2. A conveyance of real property, when acknowledged by the
person executing the same (the acknowledgment being certified as
required by law) may be recorded in the office of the recording officer of
the county where the property is situated. Every such conveyance not so
recorded is void as against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee in
good faith and for a valuable consideration from the same vendor, his
heirs or devisees, of the same real property or any portion thereof whose
conveyance is first duly recorded. An instrument is deemed recorded the
minute it is filed for record.
"Section 9. A recording officer is not liable for recording an instru-
ment in a wrong book, volume or set of records if the instrument is prop-
erly indexed with a reference to the volume and page where the instru-
ment is actually of record.
"Section 10. A recording officer, upon payment or tender to him of
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For a proper understanding of the new law, it is necessary to observe
the statute which it expressly repealed, viz., Section 10596 of Reming-
ton's Compiled Statutes. This latter reads as follows:
"All deeds, mortgages and assignments of mortgages shall
be recorded in the office of the auditor of the county where
the land is situated, and shall be valid as against bona fide
purchasers from the date of their filing for record in said
office, and when so filed shall be notice to all the world."
(For convenient reference this statute will be hereinafter referred to as
the former law, or former statute.)
The writer is informed that the code of New York state was copied
or used as a guide in drafting this new act.2  Some provisions of the
latter are the same as in the New York code, but other provisions are
different or do not appear in that code. Hence the New York decisions
construing the New York statutes cannot be accepted without qualifi-
cation as true interpretations of the provisions of this new act.
The statute expressly repealed by this new act provided for the
recordation of "deeds, mortgages and assignments of mortgages" only,
so that it is specific in designation of instruments and limited in scope.
The right to record other instruments arose from the express terms of
other sections of the code, or has been judicially determined or merely
assumed, rightly or wrongly, to exist by implication from still other
sections. A statute' prescribing the duties of county auditors as re-
corders requires them to record not only deeds and mortgages, but
also "grants and transfers of real property," releases of mortgages,
"powers of attorney to convey real estate,"' 4 leases which have been
acknowledged, contracts concerning real estate, marriage contracts,
instruments relating to the separate or community property of married
the lawful fees therefor, shall record in his office any instrument author-
ized or permitted by this act to be so recorded."
(For convenient reference this act will be hereinafter referred to as
the new law or new act.)
2The sections of this new act (the number of which is that first
given) and the corresponding section of the New York Code as shown In
chapter 51, Cahill's Consol. L. N. Y. 1923 (the second number given), are
as follows: 1-290; 2-291, 3-294, 4-295, 5-296, 6-297 7-324,
8-326. The last sentence in Section 2 is not in the corresponding section
of the New York Code. Instead the latter has a section which reads:
"Every instrument, entitled to be recorded, must be recorded by the
recording officer in the order and as of the time of its delivery to him
therefor, and -is considered recorded from the time of such delivery."
Ch. 51, § 317.
'P C. § 1640, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 10601.
P C. § 1640-1, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 10601-2.
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women, patents to land and receiver's receipts, "and all such other
papers or writings as are required by law to be recorded and such as
are required by law to be filed." 5 Prior to the inclusion, by an amend-
ment, in this section of "contracts concerning real estate," such con-
tracts had been held recordable by implication from the direction that
auditors record "grants and transfers of real property." ' And not-
withstanding the only "powers of attorney to convey real estate" have
been designated as recordable, powers of attorney for any and every
purpose touching real property have been filed and recorded. The
section which requires county auditors to keep indexes to the records
and prescribes the form thereof, directs the indexing of "every instru-
ment concerning or affecting real estate, which by law is required to
be recorded." In this section the mode is specified for indexing "any
lis pendens, judgment, notice of lien, order of sale, execution, writ of
attachment, or claims of separate or community property" In an-
other section 8 of the chapter prescribing the duties of county auditors,
the recordation of copies of final judgments or decrees partitioning or
affecting the title or possession of real property is authorized and the
record thereof declared to impart constructive notice. This gives sup-
port to the legal policy in this state of reading and construing together
these several sections relating to the duties of county auditors and the
statute concerning the recording of deeds, mortgages and assignments
of mortgages and the effect thereof as notice. Particular sections of
the code relate respectively to the filing and recording of notices of
lis pendens9 (declared to be constructive notice), mechanics' liens,10
attachment" and execution levies, 2 declarations of homestead,'8 aban-
donments of homestead, 14 notices of husband's or wife's interest in
community real property,'- mixed mortgages,16 assignments' 7 and satis-
factions of mortgages,' 8 laborers' liens on property of corporations,' 9
and other matters. Even these divers statutes do not provide, either
Note 3, supra.
P. C .§ 1640, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 10601, Bernard v. Benson, 58 Wash.
191, 108 Pac. 439, 137 Am. St. Rep. 1051 (1910).
P. C. § 1641, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 10603.
8P C. §1643, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 10605.
P C. § 8452, Rem.-Comp. Stat. § 243.
'OP. C. §§ 9710, 9711, Rem. Comp. Stat. §§ 1134, 1135.
P. C. § 7391, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 2013.
P C. § 7893-4, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 578-4.
P. C. § 7889, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 558.
"P C. § 7867, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 536.
"P C. § 1449, Rem. Comp Stat. § 10578.
11P C. § 9774, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 10597.
P7P C. § 9742, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 10616.
"P C. § 9743, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 10617.
"P. C. § 9738, Rem. Comp. Stat. § 1150.
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expressly or by reasonable implication, for the recordation of some instru-
ments which are proper, valid, and effective between the parties thereto.
For example, agreements between mortgagees and other lien claimants
for subordinating or postponing the prior to a junior incumbrance or
lien do not appear to be within the terms of any statute relating to
recordation, and so have not been recordable. 20  The practical benefits
of recordation have and do induce disregard of the limitations of the
law, and give rise to a custom to file and record instruments not within
the letter of the law, as heretofore illustrated, but a custom does not
make the law, 21 though it may aid in interpretation of the law in
instances of uncertainty 22 Thus, prior to the Act of 1897, authorizing
recordation of assignments of mortgages, these were recorded though
not entitled to be, as observed in Howard v. Shaw.21 And, likewise,
executory contracts for the sale of real estate were assumed to be re-
cordable and were recorded long prior to the decision in Berndrd v.
Benson,24 holding them by implication from various statutes to be within
the recording laws.
In striking contrast to the narrow and insufficient designation of
recordable instruments in the former statute are the comprehensive
provisions of the new act. It authorizes recordation not merely of
"deeds, mortgages and assignments of mortgages," as did the repealed
statute, but of every "conveyance," which includes, by express defini-
tion, "every written instrument by which any estate or interest in real
property is created, transferred, mortgaged or assigned or by which the
title to any real property may be affected, including an instrument in
execution of a power, although the power be one of revocation only,
and an instrument releasing in whole or in part, postponing or subor-
dinating a mortgage or other lien, except a will, a lease for a term of
not exceeding two years, an executory contract for the sale or purchase
of lands, and an instrument granting a power to convey real property
as the agent or attorney for the owner of the property." Instruments
by which the holders of paramount or prior mortgages or other liens
may subordinate the same to otherwise subordinate and junior mortgages
and liens, and assignments of leases, neither of which were by express
terms or by clear implication within the scope of the recording system
"°Gillig v. Maass, 28 N. Y. 191 (1863) holding such paper not within
recording act.
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prior to this new act, are expressly brought within and given the benefit
of that system by this new law.
The statute repealed by the new act declares "deeds, mortgages and
assignments of mortgages" shall be valid against bona fide purchasers
from the "date of their filing" for record, and when so filed should be
"notice to all the world." This statute imposes on a bona fide for
value grantee, mortgagee or assignee of a mortgage the obligation of
giving constructive notice of his claim, if he desires the protection
afforded by the statute, by filing his instrument, and not only to file it,
but to file it before a subsequent bona fide purchaser or mortgagee
pays his money and obtains his instrument. If the first purchaser fails
to do so, the subsequent purchaser prevails although the latter does not
file his instrument for record before the first purchaser files his own.25
For example, suppose A, owner of land, conveys the same to B, who
does not at once file his deed for recordation. While B's deed is
unrecorded, A sells and conveys the same land to C, who pays value,
in good faith, without notice or knowledge of B's deed. Then B files
his deed, and later C files his deed for record. Under this statute C
prevails over B, because B, by his neglect to file his deed, failed to
give constructive notice thereof to C before C paid his money and
secured his deed. Manifestly, this rule gives a bona fide purchaser
for value full protection against the claims of prior purchasers not of
record at the moment he completes his transaction. The fact that sub-
sequent to that moment the instrument, deed or mortgage of a prior
purchaser may be filed for record before the subsequent purchaser can
get to the recorder's office to file his own instrument cannot affect the
latter. Under this rule a bona fide purchaser is enabled to rely upon
the record of disclosing the true state of the title, so far as he is con-
cerned, at the moment he completes his transaction. While such pur-
chaser is under no obligation to file his instrument and secure priority
of record in order to defeat the claim of a prior purchaser, yet he is
obligated to give notice by filing his instrument in order to secure pro-
tection against a transaction subsequent to his own-against a subse-
quent bona fide purchaser for value. Thus, in the supposed case, if,
after the sale and conveyance to C, and while his deed is unrecorded,
B sells and conveys to E, E would prevail over C, C's situation with
regard to E being similar to B's with regard to C. This rule has the
disadvantage that one who has paid his money, taken his instrument
and filed the same, and who is undisputed record owner, is not thereby
SIwanstrom v. Washtngton Trust Co., 41 Wash. 561, 83 Pae. 1112
(1906) Miller v. Merine, 43 Fed. 261 (1890).
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assured of ownership, unless his instrument were filed for record at the
moment his transaction was completed. If any time elapsed between
completion of his transaction and the filing of his instrument, his appar-
ent absolute record ownership may be defeated by one who made a
subsequent purchase without notice. And the latter party is under no
obligation to give record notice of his claim to such prior apparent
record owner. Thus, in the supposed case, when B filed his deed, he
was record owner, and the owner so far as he knew, but actually not
owner at all by reason of the sale and conveyance by A to C. Mani-
festly, under this rule priority of record does not necessarily confer
priority of claim. A bona fide purchaser is protected from the moment
he pays his money and takes his deed or mortgage against prior pur-
chasers whose claims are not then of record, but not against subsequent
purchasers except those who become such after his instrument has been
filed for record. Protection is secured by the simultaneous completion
of transaction and filing of instrument.
In sharp contrast to the foregoing rule and its consequences are the
rule and its effects established by the new act. This act declares an
unrecorded conveyance void as to a subsequent bona fide purchaser or
mortgagee, for value, of the same land or part thereof, from the same
vendor, whose conveyance is "first duly recorded." 26 In other words,
the deed or mortgage of the first purchaser is always valid except and
until a subsequent bona fide purchaser for value files his instrument
for record before the first purchaser files his own. As between two
bona fide purchasers for value of the same estate or interest, priority
of record determines priority in fact and law A simple, definite
standard or test is established for the determination of priority in such
cases. This rule does not require, as did the rule under the former
statute, that the first purchaser file his instrument and thereby give
constructive notice of his claim before the subsequent purchaser pays
2' This rule obtains in the majority of jurisdictions. While the stat-
utes are not worded alike, they are given a like construction. Brown v.
Jackson, 3 Wheat. 449, 4 L. ed. 432 (1818) Mullins v. Butte Hardware Co.,
25 Mont. 525, 65 Pac. 1004, 87 Am. St. Rep. 430 (1901) Schott v. Dash, 49
Nebr. 187, 68 N. W 346, 59 Am. St. Rep. 531 (1896) Jackson v. Given, 8
Johns (N. Y.) 137, 5 Am. Dec. 328 (1811) Ledyard v. Butler 9 Paige
(N. Y.) 132, 37 Am. Dec. 379 (1841) Wilhelm v. Wilken, 149 N. Y. 447,
44 N. E. 82, 32 L. R. A. 370, 52 Am. St. Rep. 743 (1896) Musgrove v.
Bonser 5 Ore. 213, 20 Am. Rep. 737 (1874) Parrish v. Mahany, 10 S. D.
276, 73 N. W 97, 66 Am. St. Rep. 715 (1897). Notes: Ann. Cas. 1912A,
195, 197 7 Ann. Cas. 367 21 L. R. A. 33; 13 L. R. A. 238. The rule
referred to in Swanstrom v. Washington Trust Co., note 25, supra. It is
the statutory rule in Oregon (See. 9874, Olson's 1920 Oregon Laws) and
in Idaho (Sec. 5424 Comp. Stat.) This Idaho statute is like the new
Washington act in regard to the "first duly recorded" instrument pre-
vailing.
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his money and takes his deed or mortgage. The latter may pay and
get his deed or mortgage in ignorance of the prior transaction and
with the utmost good faith, and yet lose because the first purchaser gets
to the recorder's office and files his instrument "first," that is, before
or ahead of the subsequent purchaser. Apply this rule to the hitherto
supposed case, and the result is B, and not C, prevails, merely because
B filed his deed before C filed his. This rule gives a purchaser, in the
situations under consideration, who sees his deed first of record a cer-
tainty of ownership not always afforded by the former statute. But
this new act does not give a purchaser record protection at the time
he closes his transaction-pays his money and gets his instrument-
since notwithstanding he does so in reliance upon what the record
shows, he may be defeated by another party, whose claim is not dis-
closed by the record, who files his instrument first. This system does
not give the protection against all prior parties as of the moment a
transaction is completed as the former statute did. But when an instru-
ment is filed for record, full protection is given against all prior and
subsequent parties whose claims are not of record at the time the instru-
ment is filed. To secure protection under this system, as under the
other heretofore mentioned, the closing of a transaction and the filing
of instruments should be simultaneous events.
An instrument must, of course, be filed before it can be recorded-
indexed and transcribed in a book in the manner prescribed by law. It
is the obligation of the grantee, mortgagee, or vendee to see that his
instrument is filed for recordation. It is the duty of county auditors
as recorders to index and transcribe instruments filed for that purpose.
Necessarily a more or less period of time elapses between the moment
an instrument is filed and the moment it is indexed, and between either
or both of these and the moment the transcription of the instrument is
completed. Even a minute of time may be a vital element in the
determination of priority. The new act gives priority to the convey-
ance "first duly recorded." Standing alone this phrase would mean
that instrument which is first properly recorded in the mode prescribed
by law prevails. To avoid the uncertainty of that moment of time, the
declaration is made, "an instrument is deemed recorded the minute it
is filed for record."
It is the obligation of the grantee or mortgagee to file his deed or
mortgage, and it is the duty of the county auditor as recorder to do
the indexing and transcribing the law requires to be done. Due to
fraud, negligence, mistake, or other cause, the auditor may not properly
or accurately index or transcribe an instrument in the mode required
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by law, or may fail to index or transcribe it at all.2 7  Consequently a
party, using the index to ascertain what is of record in the chain of
title to the land he contemplates dealing with, may fail to find an
instrument, or a given transcription may not inform him of the true
contents of the instrument it purports to be a copy of, as, for example,
a deed duly transcribed may not be indexed, 28 or the transcription of a
mortgage may show it given to secure a smaller amount than the
mortgage itself secures. 29  This party, knowing of no facts save what
he has found and been advised of by the record, completes his trans-
action in reliance thereon. Now, either he must be protected by the
record as it stands, or the grantee or mortgagee whose instrument was
not recorded as it should have been must be. One or the other must
lose. As to who loses in situations of this kind there is a conflict of
authority 30 As the recording system in every state is a statutory cre-
ation, the decisions are supposed to be based upon the provisions of
the statute of the particular jurisdiction, but one or the other of certain
general principles are given great weight. In some jurisdictions it is
held that a grantee or mortgagee is only obligated to file his instrument,
and that thereafter he is fully protected no matter whether it be
subsequently indexed and copied correctly or not at all. This means
2 In this state an instance of omission is disclosed in Ritchie v. G-ri-
fiths, I Wash. 429, 25 Pac. 341, 22 Am. St. Rep. 155, 12 L. R. A. 384 (1890),
(deed not indexed) and an instance of error in Bernard v. Benson, note 6,
supra (contract recorded in wrong book) Other cases are: Chamberlain
v. Bell, 7 Cal. 292, 68 Am. Dec. 260 (1857) Gilchrist v. Gough, 63 Ind. 576,
30 Am. Rep. 250 (1878) Prouty v. Marshall, 225 Pa. St. 570, 74 Atl. 550,
25 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1211 (1909) Bedford v. Tupper 30 Hun. (N. Y.) 174
(1883) Merrick v. Wallace, 19 Ill. 486 (1858) Brydon v. Campbell, 40 Md.
331 (1874) Fincher v. Hanegan, 59 Ark. 151, 26 S. W 821, 24 L. R. A. 543
(1894) Parsons v. Lent, 34 N. J. Eq. 69 (1889) Crews v. Taylor 56 Tex.
461 (1882) Hartwell v. Riley, 62 N. Y. S. 317 (App. Div. 1900) Reeder
v. State, 98 Ind. 114 (1884) State v. Davis, 96 Ind. 539 (1884) Nichols v.
Reynolds, 1 R. I. 30, 36 Am. Dec. 238 (1840) Zenter v. Edgar Zinc Co., 79
Kan. 406, 99 Pac. 614 (1909) Mims v. Mims, 35 Ala. 23 (1859) White v.
Himmelberger-Harrtson Lumber Co., 240 Mo. 13, 139 S. W 553, 42 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 151 (1911) Beekman v. Frost, 18 Johns. (N. Y.) 544, 9 Am. Dec.
246 (1820).
21 Ritchie v. Griffiths, note 27, supra.
21 Gilchrist v. Gough, note 27, supra ($5000 mortgage transcribed
$500) Beekman v'. Frost, note 27, supra ($3000 mortgage transcribed as
$300).
"Specific examples of this conflict in decisions involving like situa-
tions are manifested, for example, in these two cases: where mortgage for
$1000 transcribed as mortgage for $100, the subsequent purchaser held
charged with notice of what mortgage showed, the mortgagee not being
responsible for the error of recorder, Zear v. Boston, etc., Tr Co., 5 Kan.
App. 505, 43 Pac. 977 (1896). But in Gilchrist v. Gough, note 27, supra,
where a mortgage for $5000 was transcribed as given for $500, held that
the record was notice to subsequent purchaser of what it showed and no
more; mortgagee being deemed responsible for accuracy of record held to
be the loser.
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that an instrument which has been duly filed for record thereafter
imparts constructive notice of its existence and contents no matter
whether it be incorrectly indexed or transcribed, or be not indexed or
copied at all. Any injury resulting from an error or omission is held
to fall upon the subsequent purchaser, who may recover from the
recorder therefor.3 ' In other jurisdictions a grantee or mortgagee is
obligated to see that his instrument is correctly transcribed-the record
is notice only of what it shows-but does not have to see that it is
indexed.82 In yet other jurisdictions, a grantee or mortgagee is re-
sponsible for both indexing and transcribing, which means that unless
his instrument is indexed and transcribed .it will not operate as notice,
and the record copy of the instrument is notice of what it shows and
nothing else.ii This rule was established in this state at an early date
by the decision in Ritchie v. Griffiths.3 4  In this case a deed, duly filed
for record, had been copied in a book of deeds, but not indexed, and
the record as made was held not to have imparted constructive notice,
so a subsequent purchaser, without actual notice, of the same land was
held to have the superior title. In support of this rule it is said, since
the statute imposed upon a grantee the obligation to give constructive
notice of his deed, that obligation required him to see that his deed
was indexed and transcribed in the manner prescribed by law, so that
a subsequent party could obtain from the record information of the
first party's claim. A grantee controls his own deed, can record it or
not as he sees fit, and has the opportunity and the right as no one
else has to see that recordation of it is properly made. In doing that
work, the recorder is agent of the grantee, who pays him for that
service. And it is said.
"It may be a hardship, but where one of two innocent
persons must suffer, the rule is that the misfortune must rest
on the person in whose business and under whose control it
1Chapman v. Johnson, 142 Ala. 633, 38 So. 797, 4 Ann. Cas. 559 (1905),
and note; Deming v. Miles, 35 Nebr. 739, 53 N. W 665, 37 Am. St. Rep.
464 (1892) and note; Parrish v. Mahany, 10 S. D. 276, 73 N. W 97, 66
Am. St. Rep. 715 (1897), and note; Neas v. Whitener-London Realty Co.,
119 Ark. 301, 178 S. W 390, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 780, L. R. A. 1916A, 525
(1915) Atlas Lumber Co. v. Canadian-Amertean Mtg. and Tr. Co., 36 N. D.
39, 161 N. W 604 (1917) Gillespie v. Rogers, 146 Mass. 613, 16 N. E. 711
(1888) Hodges v. Simpson, 89 Okla. 80, 213 Pac. 737 (1923) Beverly V.
Ellis, 1 Rand (Va.) 102 (1822) Mims v. Mims, note 27, supra, Mangold v.
Barlow, 51 Miss. 593, 48 Am. Rep. 84 (1874) Notes, Ann. Cas. 1913B, 69.
"Bishop v. Schneider 46 Mo. 472 (1891).
13Ritchie v. Griffiths, note 27, supra, Gilchrist v. Gough, note 27,
supra, Barney v. McCarty, 15 Ia. 510, 83 Am. Dec. 427 (1864) White v.
Minnelberger-Harrison Lumber Co., note 27, supra, Prouty v. Marshall,
note 27, supra.
31 Note 27, supra.
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happened, and who had it in his power to avert it. Any other
rule would be abhorrent to our natural ideas of right, and
would render perilous every business enterprise."
Under this rule the instrument itself is deemed notice of its existence
and contents after it is filed for record and until it is indexed and
transcribed, then the instrument is superseded by the record as made,
which is notice of what it shows and no more. To support this view
the statute imposing on grantees and mortgagees the obligation of giving
notice of their instruments, and the statutes prescribing the duties of
county auditors as recorders in indexing and transcribing instruments
filed for record, are read and construed together. Statutory require-
ments as to the contents of the index, the necessity of the index as a
means to find what matters are of record relating to or concerning a
particular property, the reliance thereon by searchers, and the conse-
quent need that the indexes be a dependable source of information, are
emphasized to support the view that they are an essential part of the
record of every instrument.
It must be observed that the statute in force when the Ritchie case,
supra, was decided, declared deeds and mortgages should
"be valid against bona fide purchasers, from the date of their
filing or recording in said office, and when so filed or recorded
shall be notice to all the world." "
This statute was amended in 1897,6 after the decision in the Ritchie
case, supra, in order to include assignments of mortgages, the latter
having been held not to be within the statute." The words "or
recording" and "or recorded" were omitted from the statute as amended,
which is that statute expressly repealed by the new act. Notwith-
standing that the amended statute declared an instrument should pre-
vail and be notice from the time it was "filed," the rule in the Ritchie
case has been considered as existing under the amended statute as
evidenced by its recognition and application in various cases. Thus,
in Malbou v. Grow "' the Ritchie case supra, is cited and quoted, the
rule therein announced stated and applied, and the issue whether the
description of property in a mortgage had been sufficiently and properly
indexed so as to impart constructive notice was determined in the light
of the rule. In Sawyer v. Vermont Loan and Trust Company,"9 the
"Hill's Ann. Codes and Stat. § 1439.
"Sess. L. 1897, P. 5, § 1.
"Howard v. Shaw, note 21, supra, Fischer v. Woodruff, 25 Wash. 67,
64 Pac. 923, 87 Am. St. Rep. 742 (1901).
n15 Wash. 301, 46 Pac. 330 (1896)
" 41 Wash. 524, 84 Pac. 8 (1906).
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contention that notice of the filing of a deed would be good for only
twenty days, unless the deed was actually recorded, is answered in the
negative, the Court saying-
"When a person has filed in the county auditor's office for
record an instrument authorized to be recorded, we do not
think delay or neglect of the county auditor in actually re-
cording said instrument can militate against the party who
duly filed said instrument for record, if it was promptly and
properly indexed in the book required by law to be kept for
that purpose."
In BeIrnard v. Benson,40 the statutes governing the duties of recorders
and the statute authorizing the recording of deeds, etc., and declaring
their effect as notice, were, as in the Ritchie case, construed together
as in part materia for the determination of the issue whether executory
contracts for the sale of land were entitled to be recorded, and, if
recorded, whether the record thereof had effect as constructive notice.
And it was therein held that such instruments were recordable, and
that the record thereof in the wrong book-Miscellaneous Records
instead of Book of Deeds-did not impart notice, thereby adhering to
the declaration in the Ritchie case, which is cited, "that constructive
notice does not arise from an attempt to comply with the registry
laws." In Jones v. Berg,41 it was held that an index of the record of
a deed, in which index the description of the premises was noted as
"part" of lots designated by number and the name of the addition,
imparted notice to a purchaser of adjoining property which was part,
though not the same part, of the property so indexed, of the grant of
an easement over such adjoining property. And in the relatively recent
case of Haggerty v. Building Investment Co.,42 the various statutes
relating to the duties of recorders and the statute governing the
effect of the records of deeds, mortgages, etc., as notice, were, as in
the Ritchie case, supra, construed together to determine the issue whether
a deed, absolute in form, but intended as a mortgage, recorded and
indexed as its form suggested-as a deed-imparted constructive notice.
In holding it did, the Court said,
"since every searcher gains the information from the general
index which leads him to the instrument desired, we think all
must take notice of what the general index reveals, and none
may be heard to say that, because the auditor may, for his
own convenience or that of the public, record some of the
'ONote 6, supra.
2105 Wash. 69, 177 Pac. 712 (1919).
42111 Wash. 638, 191 Pac. 760 (1920).
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instruments there indexed in one book and some in another,
he may shut his eyes to what the index, speaking as the statute
directs, tells him."
A careful study of the briefs filed and the decision rendered in the
Ritchie case indicates that the words "or recording" and "or recorded"
as alternatives after the words "filing" and "filed" in the statute in
force when that case was decided did not influence that decision at
all. So that it appears that the rule therein established was as ap-
plicable to the succeeding amended statute as it was to the one so
amended.
Does the new act abrogate the rule in the Ritchze case, supra? The
statutes prescribing the mode of recording and the duties of county audi-
tors in indexing and transcribing referred to in that case have not been
changed in material particulars and remain in force. A grantee or
mortgagee is still under obligation to file his instrument. Section 10
of the new act expressly commands county auditors, upon payment of
their fees therefor, to record instruments, and thereby may appear to
make those officers agents, as held in the Ritchie case, supra, for parties
filing instruments in doing the work of recordation. Applicable also
may appear to be the equitable principle applied in that case, that where
one of two innocent persons must suffer, the misfortune must rest upon
the one in whose business and under whose control it happened, and
who had it in his power to avert it. All that is said in the Ritchie case,
supra, touching the index being an essential part of the record is as
true now as when uttered, and even more so because of the vastly
increased volume of the records. An instrument can and ought to
be indexed immediately on its reception, the notation of the book and
page of transcription being made when ascertained. It does not seem
to impose any hardship on a grantee or mortgagee to see that his instru-
ment is properly indexed. But, while these various general principles
may appear applicable, they are not under the new act. The whole
argument in the Ritchie case, supra, is based upon the statutory obliga-
tion of a grantee or mortgagee to give constructive notice of his instru-
ment by recordation thereof in the manner prescribed by law The
new act sets aside that obligation, and establishes a different principle.
Between a prior and subsequent bona fide for value purchaser or mort-
gagee of all or part of the same land from the same grantor, priority
is determined merely by priority of record, without regard to the fact
the first grantee or mortgagee had not given constructive notice of
his claim at the time the second grantee completed his transaction.
This is the object and purpose of the new law While a grantee
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or mortgagee pays a fee for recording his instrument, the recorder is
not thereby made his agent. The moment an instrument, duly acknowl-
edged, with that fact certified, is filed, it is deemed recorded, although
it be improperly indexed or transcribed or not indexed or transcribed
at all. In support of this new rule it is argued that the parties to a
transaction, having exchanged consideration and instrument, and the
latter having been filed for record, and being then shown to be first
of record, should not be prejudiced by subsequent acts or omissions
of the recorder in making recordation. To permit that renders perilous
every transaction by imparting to it a hazard the parties cannot control.
And it is said, other things being equal, the maxim is, he who is prior
in time is prior in right.43 Under this new act it is the view that
when a grantee or mortgagee files his instrument, he does his full
duty, and is under no obligation to see that his instrument is properly
indexed or recorded. That requirement is for the convenience and
benefit of subsequent parties, and they, when injured by an error in
or omission from the record, must seek recovery in damages from the
recorder."4  Obviously, under this rule, a subsequent party may not
find, by reason of some error in or omission from the record, all that is
necessary for his protection-the existence of an instrument and its
true contents. In extenuation it is pointed out that the records may
fail to give full information of many matters, even if properly made.
"For example, an apparently perfect record title may be
bad, because the grantor in a deed may have been disseized or
insane, or because the title has been defeated by adverse pos-
session. In either of these cases, resort must be had to extrinsic
evidence to determine where the title is; and whoever searches
the title upon the records, if he would be absolutely safe, must
do so with a knowledge of facts not disclosed by the records
themselves." 41
Which is the better rule, that existing under the former statute or
that established by the new act, is a matter of opinion. Considering
the enormous number of instruments filed, and the fewness of deci-
sions involving either rule, it appears that one offers no superior advan-
tage over the other from a practical standpoint.
Section 9 of this new act declares a recording officer shall not be
liable for recording an instrument in the wrong book, volume or page,
if the instrument is properly indexed with reference to the volume
and page of the book where actually recorded. It has been held that
13 Oats v. We Us, 28 Ark. 244 (1873).
"See cases under note 31, supra.
" Gillespie v. Rogers, note 31, supra.
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the record of an executory contract of sale of realty in a book which
the auditor entitled "Miscellaneous Records," and the index of the
contract with reference thereto, did not operate to give constructive
notice.4 6  The object of this section is to avoid that result in like
situations. Since the title to this new act declares it concerns instru-
ments to real property, Section 9 necessarily applies to such instruments
only, and, therefore, its provisions afford no protection to an auditor
in cases of transcription of instruments relating to personal property
in the wrong book. Section 9 makes the index a part of the record
of instruments affecting real property. This is of no consequence to
a grantee, mortgagee or vendee who has filed his paper, as he is not
prejudiced by an erroneous record of it, but is of importance to subse-
quent purchasers, since it requires them to take notice of whatever
the index shows in the line of title to the property they deal with.
Leases for one year and upward must be acknowledged, and it seems,
therefore, that this act could well have been made applicable to leases
for that rmnimum instead of to leases only for two years or more.
The differentiation accomplishes no purpose and may produce con-
fusion. While a specified statute is expressly repealed by this new
act and this act substituted therefor, yet the act is far more compre-
hensive in provisions and scope than the statute which it repealed,
since it includes and is applicable to various instruments which are
the subject-matter of particular statutes. The act, therefore, repeals
by implication certain sections of the code or provisions therein in con-
flict with this act. To have specifically set forth and expressly repealed
in this act the statutes it conflicts with and impliedly repeals would
have given a certainty and definiteness to the law that is highly desir-
able, especially in a matter like this which so vitally concerns the mass
of people.
Seattle, Washington. F C. HACKMAN.*
"Note 6, supra.
*Of the Seattle Bar, formerly Associate Editor of LAWYER AND
BANKER, 1921-23.
